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I.

INTRODUCTON

Unlawful police activity leading to the recovery of evidence
sought to be used against a defendant in a criminal trial may
also lead to suppression of such evidence. This is an unfortunate
result for prosecutors in important cases where the difference
between conviction and acquittal turns on the admissibility of
evidence garnered from police conduct contrary to constitutional
principles.
The prevention and prosecution of drinking and driving related
offenses1 serves a vital role to the community as a whole, and
New York laws designed to combat drinking and driving related
offenses have obtained judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative
interest over the years. 2 Studies have demonstrated the greater
1 Although this piece specifically refers to 'intoxicated drivers,' and those involved in
'drinking and driving related offenses,' it should be noted that the principles highlighted
in this article are applied to cases other than those involving strict D.W.I. offenses.
Particularly, these principles should be utilized in situations involving persons operating
a motor vehicle while their ability to do so is impaired by use of a prohibited drug. See
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192.4 (McKinney 2005).
2 The New York legislators enacted a law to supplement the government's arsenal
against drunk driving. See Pringle v. Wolfe, 88 N.Y.2d 426, 429 (1996), cert. denied, 519

U.S. 1009 (1996).
The Legislature has been most concerned with evidence as to the effect that large
quantities of alcohol have on a driver. Accordingly, the legislature has increased the
scope of the Judge's power to punish for such offense. It also has provided that the
offense is a per se offense, so as to eliminate the uncertainty that prima facie tests
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chance of causing a vehicular collision when one's ability to
operate a motor vehicle is affected by the ingestion of alcohol or
other substances. 3 However, it need not take an empirical or
scientific study to understand the concerns of those prosecuting
cases involving unfortunate victims of vehicular collisions. For
obvious reasons, those prosecuting drinking and driving and
other related offenses involving injuries, substantial property
damage and fatalities to others seek to strengthen their case to
the fullest, in order to best represent not only the interests of the
victims, but also the People at large.
When a vehicular collision is involved, a defendant arrested for
driving while intoxicated, impaired, or under the influence of
drugs may be taken to the hospital for medical treatment. When
this individual is been removed to a hospital, routine police
procedures ordinarily undertaken in drinking and driving and

invariably create. Originally, the per se offense was established only by a relatively
high level of blood-alcohol, but the Legislature has repeatedly lowered the alcohol
level requisite for conviction.
People v. Cancel, 137 Misc. 2d 260, 264 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1987). The relationship between
motor vehicle accidents, fatalities, and intoxicated driving were detailed and given an indepth look by the New York Legislature when responding to this problem of drunk
driving. See People v. Schmidt, 124 Misc. 2d 102, 103 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1984); see also
Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 18 (1978). The court discussed Massachusetts' interest in
increasing public safety and the enactment of new legislation. Another court provided a
look at the New York Legislature's response to drinking and driving and noted that it
"remained disturbed at the high accident tolls involving intoxicated drivers and
recognized a 'legislative trend' in making driving while intoxicated laws tougher." People
v. Fox, 87 Misc. 2d 210, 216-17 (New Castle Justice Ct. 1976). In relation to drinking and
driving, the court stated that
[t]he increasing slaughter on our highways, most of which should be avoidable, now
reaches the astounding figures only heard of on the battlefield. The states, through
safety measures, modern scientific methods, and strict enforcement of traffic laws,
are using all reasonable means to make automobile driving less dangerous.
Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957).
3 See Alcohol Involvement in Fatal Crashes 2000, U.S. Department of Transportation
National Highway Traffic Administration, at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/nc
salrpts/2002OOalcoholrptlalcOOchapl.htm (Mar. 2002) (providing statistical information
relating to alcohol related accidents, and stating, "[lIt is a well-established fact that drunk
driving plays a major role in fatal crashes. Research has demonstrated that alcohol in a
driver's bloodstream greatly impairs the driver's ability to operate a vehicle safely"); see
also Traffic Safety Facts 2001 - Alcohol: A Public Information Fact Sheet on Motor
Vehicle and Traffic Safety, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's National
Center for Statistics and Analysis, at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.govpdf/nrd-3ONCSA /
TSF2001/2001 alcohol.pdf (last visited May 11, 2004) (providing statistics for driving and
alcohol related offenses). See generally Herbert Moskowitz and Dary Fiorentino, A Review
of the Literatureon the Effects of Low Doses of Alcohol on Driving-Related Skills, National
Technical Information Service, at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/research/ pub/
Hs809028/Title.htm (Apr. 2000) (examining effects of low doses of alcohol on drivingrelated skills).
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related arrests cannot occur. 4 As such, a defendant's submission
to standard physical coordination tests - or routine questioning does not occur as it would if the person was taken into custody at
a police station house. 5 Likewise, there will be no availability for
the taking of a breath test to determine blood alcohol content,
because access to an instrument regularly used for breath alcohol
testing will not be present in the hospital.
As no standard sobriety tests occur when a defendant is taken
to a hospital, a prosecutor's strongest evidence may lie in the
defendant's blood sample. Assuming that blood is drawn from a
defendant while they are in the hospital, the prosecutor's
question becomes whether or not the results of this blood sample
potentially demonstrating blood alcohol content are admissible
against the defendant at trial. 6
The New York Vehicle and Traffic Law allows for a prosecutor
to apply for a court order to compel a defendant to submit to a
blood test in limited circumstances. 7 Section 1194 (3) of the
4 See, e.g, People v. Berg, 92 N.Y.2d 701, 703 (1999) (noting some sobriety tests that
individuals suspected of driving while intoxicated are requested to perform, such as
recitation of alphabet, horizontal gaze nystagmus test, walk and turn test, and one-leg
stand); see also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 585 (1990) (explaining standard
sobriety tests that police request of persons suspected of intoxicated driving); South
Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 555 (1983) (describing physical blood alcohol test
evidence that law enforcement attempts to seek from individual suspected of driving
while intoxicated).
5 Neville, 459 U.S. at 555 (discussing blood alcohol test that occurs after drunk driver
is arrested).
6 See People v. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d 97, 109-10 (1982) (holding there must be consent
or court order to obtain results of blood test, as there is no "common-law right to take
blood samples in absence of a court order" and that "the taking of blood in any other
matter is foreclosed"). But see N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194 (2) (McKinney 2005)
(discussing applicability of implied consent provisions of Vehicle and Traffic Law).
7 See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194 (3) (McKinney 2005). (stating circumstances,
other than obtaining a court order, where defendant can be compelled to submit to a blood
test); New York Criminal Procedure Law § 240.40 (2), stating,
Upon motion of the prosecutor, and subject to constitutional limitation, the court in
which an indictment, superior court information, prosecutors information,
information, or simplified information charging a misdemeanor is pending: (a) must
order discovery as to any property not disclosed upon a demand pursuant to section
240.30, if it finds that the defendant's refusal to disclose such material is not
justified; and (b) may order the defendant to provide non-testimonial evidence. Such
order may, among other things, require the defendant to:
(i) Appear in a line-up;
(ii) Speak for identification by witness or potential witness;
(iii) Be fingerprinted;
(iv) Pose for photographs not involving reenactment of an event;
(v) Permit the taking of samples of blood, hair or other materials from his body in a
manner not involving an unreasonable intrusion there- of or a risk of serious physical
injury thereto;
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Vehicle and Traffic Law5 allows a compulsory chemical test to be
administered when a defendant has 1) killed another, or caused
them serious physical injury; 2) has operated a motor vehicle in

violation of the drinking and driving statutes embodied within
the Vehicle and Traffic Law; 3) has been placed under arrest; and
4) has refused to provide their consent to a chemical test, or is
unable to provide their consent. 9
(vi) Provide specimens of his handwriting;
(vii) Submit to a reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body.
This subdivision shall not be construed to limit, expand, or otherwise affect the
issuance of a similar court order, as may be authorized by law, before the filing of an
accusatory instrument consistent with such rights as the defendant may derive from
the constitution of this state or of the United States. This section shall not be
construed to limit or otherwise affect the administration of a chemical test where
otherwise authorized pursuant to section one thousand one hundred ninety-four-a of
the vehicle and traffic law.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 240.40 (2) (McKinney 2005). As provided for in the statute, a
court can order a defendant to submit to a blood test. However, this provision of the
Criminal Procedure Law is contained within Article 240, and as such, is rule of discovery,
not evidence. In order for a court to be permitted to issue an order pursuant to this
statute, the individual from whom the prosecutor wishes to obtain the sample must be an
individual who stands charged. As such, there must be an accusatory instrument filed
against the individual to get a blood order pursuant to this section. see also People v.
Casadei, 106 A.D.2d 885, 885 (4th Dep't 1984); Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 109-10; Matter of Abe
A., 56 N.Y.2d 288, 291 (1982) (setting forth another alternative for obtaining a court order
for a compelled blood sample pursuant to case law).
However, in a practical sense, utilizing C.P.L. § 240.40 is not an effective tool as an
alternative to New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (3). Use of C.P.L. § 240.40 would
inhibit the prosecution's case should the prosecution need to wait until the filing of an
accusatory instrument. Both the Vehicle and Traffic Law and the New York Compilation
of Codes, Rules and Regulations have a preference for obtaining a sample within two
hours of arrest. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194 (2)(a)(1)(2) (McKinney 2005). This details
the implied consent provisions of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Methods and Proceduresfor
Determining Blood and Urine Alcohol, N.Y. COMP. CODES, R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 59.2 (c)(2)
(2004). This further discusses the implied consent provisions. Even the Court of Appeals
has recognized the rapid rate in which alcohol dissipates in the blood. People v. Gursey,
22 N.Y.2d 224, 230 (1968). Common sense would dictate that between the time of routine
arrest processing by the police, the prosecutor's office and the court, and the time in which
an accusatory instrument is considered 'filed' for purposes within the meaning of C.P.L. §
240.40 is a substantial period. Thus, there is an ample amount of time for the blood
alcohol content within the blood to significantly diminish. By the time a court order
pursuant to C.P.L. § 240.40 is signed and executed, its value may be nil. Likewise, a
delayed time in execution may lead to the creation of exculpatory evidence. Thus, C.P.L. §
240.40 does not provide the best method of obtaining a D.W.I. defendant's blood sample.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 240.40 (2) (McKinney 2005).
8 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 1194 (3) (McKinney 2005) (explaining the compulsory
chemical test administered in certain circumstances).
9 See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194 (3) (McKinney 2005). The statute states,
3. Compulsory chemical tests.
(a) Court ordered chemical tests. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision two of
this section, no person who operates a motor vehicle in this state may refuse to
submit to a chemical test of one or more of the following: breath, blood, urine or
saliva, for the purpose of determining the alcoholic and/or drug content of the blood
when a court order for such chemical test has been issued in accordance with the
provisions of this subdivision.
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However, there are many other situations in which a court
order is not authorized pursuant to the Vehicle and Traffic Law,
but the prosecutor nevertheless desires to obtain a defendant's
blood sample, regardless of whether or not consent was provided
for its withdrawal. Such situations include the high profile case,
when substantial property damage occurs, or injuries that do not
rise to the level of what is considered as serious under the New
York Penal Law. 10
In these types of situations which fall outside the realm of
criteria necessary for a court order pursuant to Vehicle and
Traffic Law § 1194, if blood was drawn at the request of the
police, with the consent of the defendant, the narrower question
for the prosecutor becomes whether or not this consent was
validly obtained. Alternatively, if deemed consent is used to
justify admission, the question becomes whether the implied
consent prerequisites as set forth in the statute were met and
whether the statutory requirements have been followed. Should
the results of the blood test indicate a presence of illegal
substances, or alcohol in excess of the legal limit, a prosecutor
hopes that the answers to these questions are a resounding 'yes.'
Should the answer be 'yes,' the results of the defendant's blood
alcohol level survive a suppression hearing and can be used
against the defendant in the prosecutor's direct case. Then the
issues confronted in this article become purely academic.
However, should a suppression court find that deemed consent is
inapplicable, or the defendant did not provide valid consent to
allow the police to withdraw blood from their body, the
(b) When authorized. Upon refusal by any person to submit to a chemical test or any
portion thereof as described above, the test shall not be given unless a police officer or
a district attorney, as defined in subdivision thirty-two of section 1.20 of the criminal
procedure law, requests and obtains a court order to compel a person to submit to a
chemical test to determine the alcoholic or drug content of the person's blood upon a
finding of reasonable cause to believe that:
(1) such person was the operator of a motor vehicle and in the course of such
operation a person other than the operator was killed or suffered serious physical
injury as defined in section 10.00 of the penal law; and
(2) a. either such person operated the vehicle in violation of any subdivision of section
eleven hundred ninety-two of this article, or b. a breath test administered by a police
officer in accordance with paragraph (b) of subdivision one of this section indicates
that alcohol has been consumed by such person; and
(3) such person has been placed under lawful arrest; and (4) such person has refused
to submit to a chemical test or any portion thereof, requested in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph (a) of subdivision two of this section or is unable to give
consent to such a test.
10 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00 (10) (McKinney 2005).
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prosecution's case is substantially weakened, as the results of the
blood sample remain within the realm of protected physicianpatient privilege."l
For those prosecutors not willing to bet on a judicial finding of
valid consent, there are alternative means to amplify the
strength of the case. The use of search warrants (and in some
cases, subpoenas) to obtain blood samples drawn by hospital
personnel during the defendant's stay at the hospital has
provided the prosecutor with a highly effective tool in the fight
against drinking and driving.12 However, there may be several
caveats that the unwary prosecutor should be made aware of in
regards to obtaining a secondary sample. Such caveats include
the legal admissibility of this second sample under New York
law, as well as scientific principles that may lead to the creation
of exculpatory evidencel 3 due to improper preservation of the
blood sample. Most prosecutors, like a majority of civil attorneys,
may be unfamiliar with the rules of science that relate to the
dissipation and absorption of alcohol. This unfamiliarity may be
a byproduct of the common attorney's reason for attending law
school and desire in becoming a lawyer in the first place-the
ultimate legal goal of avoiding anything and everything that has
some relation to math and science.
Should a warrant be obtained, and as a result, a secondary
sample of blood be made available to the prosecution, it would
appear that the prosecution has a strong case. But as time goes
on, problems may develop. The two most devastating things that
11 See N.Y. C.P.LR. § 4504 (McKinney 2005).
12 See People v. Bolson, 183 Misc. 2d 155, 157 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. 1999). The
type of situation discussed in this article, involving already drawn hospital blood, should
be distinguished from a situation in which the police or prosecutor seek to obtain a
compelled sample. Blood drawn in the latter situation, for D.W.I. and related cases,
notwithstanding C.P.L.§ 240.40, is mainly covered in NEW YORK VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC
LAW § 1194 (3). Situations not falling within the realm of V.T.L. § 1194 (3), where
compulsory blood samples are sought, are governed by the principles of Matter of Abe A.,
56 N.Y.2d 288 (1982), in which the Court of Appeals held that a court order for a
defendant's blood sample may be obtained when it is established that: there is "(1)
probable cause to believe the suspect has committed the crime; (2) a 'clear indication' that
relevant material evidence will be found, and (3) the method used to secure it is safe and
reliable." Id. at 291. The Court further stated that "the seriousness of the crime, the
importance of the evidence to the investigation and the unavailability of less intrusive
means of obtaining it," must be weighed against "the suspect's constitutional right to be
free from bodily intrusion" Id.
13 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 90-91 (1963) (holding that evidence that is
material and exculpatory must be turned over to the defendant as a principle of due
process).
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could happen are: A) the consent for the initial blood sample is
deemed invalid; and B) the secondary sample was not preserved
and/or does not or cannot provide a proper blood alcohol content
reading. At this point, what was initially thought of as a strong
case with two separately tested blood samples turns into a
weaker case with no accurate blood analysis.
At this point, although hope may seem lost for the moment, a
prosecutor may have some salvation in utilizing an inevitable
discovery theory to allow the initial blood sample, suppressed due
to a judicial determination of a lack of valid implied or express
consent, to be admissible and used against the defendant at trial.
This article delves into this issue and raises the question of
whether an initially obtained blood sample ultimately suppressed
can nevertheless be used if a search warrant is obtained for a
secondary sample. This article further provides a discussion
about the interrelation of the inevitable discovery theory as an
exception to the general evidentiary exclusionary rule and the
use of search warrants in drinking and driving related offenses;
two areas of the law that may appear wholly incomparable.
II. INEVITABLE DISCOVERY
It is a common understanding that evidence obtained by illegal
police conduct - the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' - is subject to
suppression. 14 The rationale behind this rule is to prevent law
enforcement officials from violating an individual's rights, act as
a deterrent, and not afford the government an opportunity to use
evidence against a defendant obtained through exploitation of
police misconduct.15 Suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence
serves an equitable remedy-to prevent the government from
being in "a better position than it would have been in if no
illegality had transpired."16
14 See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) (explaining the
"exclusionary rule"); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)
(becoming the first Supreme Court case to speak of the "exclusionary rule" and holding
that that this rule applies to the illegally obtained evidence as well as other incriminating
evidence derived from the initially obtained evidence); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 398 (1914) (discussing procedure for wrongfully obtained evidence).
15 See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88 (noting evidence that comes forth based on
illegal police actions should not be treated as "poison").
16 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984) (rationalizing exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence).
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However, unlawful police action will not always result in
suppression of evidence. 17 Courts have carved out certain explicit
exceptions to the general exclusionary rule.' 8 One such exception
is the 'inevitable discovery' doctrine.
The 'inevitable discovery' doctrine gained much notoriety in the
infamous case of Nix v. Williams.19 The Nix case appeared to be
Robert Williams' second bite at the Supreme Court apple after
being convicted twice of the 1968 murder of ten-year-old Pamela
Powers. 2 0 However, Nix v. Williams 2 1 may be more popularly

known as the second time that the Supreme Court was
22
encountered with the 'Christian Burial Speech' case.
In Nix, an arrest warrant was obtained for Robert Williams
after a fourteen-year-old boy spotted him in the area where
Powers was last seen-a Des Moine Y.M.C.A. building-at a time
when Williams was holding a large bundle with two white legs
inside of it.23 Within two days of the victim's disappearance, a
large-scale search was performed covering miles around the area,
designed to search all locations where a young girl's body could
be. 2 4

17 We need not hold that all evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply
because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police.
Rather, the more apt question in such a case is 'whether, granting establishment of
the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come
at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to
be purged of the primary taint.
Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88.
18 See, e.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 276 (1977) (citing Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975)) (analyzing factors to determine attenuation, such as
time difference between illegal activity and discovery of evidence, flagrancy of police
misconduct, presence of intervening circumstances, and voluntary willingness of
prosecutorial witness to come forward).
19 467 U.S. 431 (1984). It should be noted that many lower courts had already
adopted or used this theory in criminal prosecutions. In fact, the Supreme Court received
numerous amicus curie briefs from other jurisdictions, including Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
of Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
20 See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 440-41 (1977) (holding Williams had right to
new trial because he was denied Sixth Amendment rights).
21 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
22 See id. at 453 (detailing burial speech that took place between Williams and
Detective Leaming).
23 See id. at 434 (stating testimony of witness who helped Williams open his car door).
24 See id. at 435 (explaining search of several miles done by two hundred volunteers).
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As this massive search was being conducted, Williams
surrendered to authorities in Davenport, Iowa. 25 The defendant
was arraigned in Davenport, and had retained an attorney. This
attorney, in conversation with both Davenport and Des Moine
authorities, came to an understanding with both law enforcement
agencies that no one would question Williams until he was
26
returned to Des Moine and in the attorney's presence.
Arrangements were made to return Williams to Des Moine, and
two Des Moine detectives traveled to Davenport, picked up
Williams, with the intent to return him to Des Moine. 27 These
detectives were fully aware that counsel represented the
defendant. 2 8 As the detectives rode back to Des Moine with
Williams, one detective, who knew that Williams was both a
29
former mental patient as well as a deeply religious individual,
had a conversation with Williams that would forever be known as
the 'Christian Burial speech.' 30 While in the police car, one of the
detectives stated,
I want to give you something to think about while we're
traveling down the road... Number one, I want you to
observe the weather conditions, it's raining, it's sleeting, it's
freezing, driving is very treacherous, visibility is poor, it's
going to be dark early this evening. They are predicting
several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that you
yourself are the only person that knows where this little
girl's body is, that you yourself have only been there once,
and if you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be unable
to find it. And, since we will be going right past the area on
the way into Des Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate
the body, that the parents of this little girl should be entitled
to a Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched
away from them on Christmas [E]ve and murdered. And I
feel we should stop and locate it on the way in rather than
waiting until morning and trying to come back out after a
25 See id. at 435 (observing that he surrendered to the local police).
26 See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 391 (1977) (stating, "Williams was not to
talk to the officers about Pamela Powers until after consulting with McKnight upon his
return to Des Moines").
27 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 435 (1984) (observing while Williams was being
picked up, volunteers and police initiated a large scale search for the body).
28 See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 391 (noting the detectives conversed with counsel).
29 See id. at 392 (noticing talk about religion occurred during the car ride).
30 See id. at 392(noting that "Detective Leaming delivered what has been referred to
in the briefs and oral arguments as the 'Christian burial speech').
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snow storm and possibly not being able to find it at all.. .Ido
not want you to answer me. I don't want to discuss it any
further. Just think about it as we're riding down the road. 31
Subsequently, Williams spoke and directed the detectives to
the location of the Power's body.32 After Williams had provided
this information, the massive search was called off.33 However,
one search team working on the case was only two and a half
miles away from this location at this time, and moving in on the
location of the body. 3 4 The actual location of the body was within
the parameters of the area to be searched. 35
In the defendant's first trial for murder, the defendant's
responses to the detective's statements were used against him.36
Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that all statements made
subsequent to the Christian Burial Speech were obtained in
violation of the defendant's right to counsel, as the defendant had
previously been arraigned. 3 7 In the defendant's second murder
trial, the prosecution did not use the defendant's statements, but
did use evidence relating to the victims body, such as the
condition that it was in when it was found, as well as tests
performed on the body.38
On the above facts, despite previously holding that the direct
evidence, the defendant's statements indicating the whereabouts
of the body, were suppressed because it was obtained
unlawfully, 3 9 in Nix v. Williams, the Supreme Court found that
evidence derived from the body could be admissible under an
'inevitable discovery' theory. 4 0

31 See id. at 392-93.
32 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 436 (1984) (stating, "the child's body was found
next to a culvert in a ditch beside a gravel road in Polk County, about two miles south of
Interstate 80, and essentially within the area to be searched").
33 See id. at 436 (stating Williams agreed to direct officers to child's body and that
search was called off).
34 See id. at 436 (describing location of search team).
35 See id. at 436 (stating child's body was within area to be searched).
36 See id. at 436-37 (noting defendant's responses were prompted by detective).
37 See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (stating right to counsel arises
after arraignment).
38 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 437 (1984) (noting admission of evidence such as
post mortem test results of victim's body).
39 See id. at 437 (explaining statements were obtained from defendant in violation of
his right to counsel).
40 See id. at 437(deciding the body would have been discovered even in absence of
incriminating statements by defendant).
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In Nix, the Supreme Court found that because of the type of
search that was conducted, involving the services of numerous
volunteers, had the search continued, the victim's body would
have inevitably been discovered. 41 The Nix case set forth the
standard that the prosecution must demonstrate in furtherance
of an inevitable discovery claim. 42 The Supreme Court held that
so long as the prosecution could demonstrate that there was a
high degree of probability that the evidence would have been
43
obtained lawfully, then it 'will not be subject to suppression.
The Nix Court justified this rule with the rationale that "the
prosecution should not be placed in a worse position [and thus
not be allowed to introduce evidence at trial] simply because of
4
some earlier police error or misconduct." 4
Like the Supreme Court, New York has adopted the inevitable
discovery theory to deny a motion to suppress. 4 5 The New York
Court of Appeals has applied inevitable discovery principles
stating, "evidence obtained as a result of information derived
from an unlawful search or other illegal police conduct is not
inadmissible under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine where
the normal course of police investigation would, in any case, even
46
absent the illicit conduct, have inevitably led to such evidence."
However, the New York Court of Appeals has had more
opportunities to discuss the inevitable discovery doctrine than
the Supreme Court, and has defined the type of evidence to
which the inevitable discovery exception to the general
exclusionary rule applies. 47 In cases in which the inevitable
discovery theory was advanced, the Court of Appeals has made a
41 See id. at 437 (noting body would have been discovered in any event).
42 See id. at 441 (establishing both state and federal courts recognize inevitable
discovery exception to exclusionary rule).
43 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (stating, "[i]f the prosecution can
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably
would have been discovered by lawful means-here the volunteers' search-then the
deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be received.").
44 Id. at 443. [emphasis added].
45 See People v. More, 97 N.Y.2d 209, 214 (2002) (recognizing, although not applying,
inevitable discovery theory).
46 People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 506 (1973). See generally People v. Payton, 45
N.Y.2d 300, 313 (1978) (holding proof in this case meets standard of inevitable discovery
doctrine and, therefore, tainted evidence is admissible), rev'd on other grounds, 445 U.S.
573 (1980).
47 See People v. Turriago, 90 N.Y.2d 77, 86 (1997) (announcing prosecution must
demonstrate "very high degree of probability" to establish inevitable discovery exception
that normal police procedures would have discovered challenged evidence).
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clear distinction between the use of primary evidence and
secondary evidence obtained from tainted police action. 4 8 In
People v. Stith,49 the Court of Appeals distinguished 'primary
evidence,' which is "obtained during or as immediate
consequence,"50 from 'secondary evidence,' which is "obtained
indirectly as a result of leads or information gained from that
primary evidence." 5 1 In Stith, the Court specifically noted that
primary evidence would still be subject to suppression regardless
of whether or not there existed a high degree of probability that
such evidence would have been discovered anyway. 52 However,
the Stith Court noted that secondary evidence could be
admissible under an inevitable discovery theory, so long as the
prosecution demonstrates with a very high degree of probability
that abidance to normal police procedures would have lead to the
discovery of the challenged evidence independently of the tainted
source. 53 Lower New York courts have recognized this distinction
and have refused to admit the "very evidence that was obtained
54
as the immediate consequence of the illegal police conduct."
III. THE NEW YORK PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
Unless the circumstances are those in which court-ordered
blood samples are allowed, as noted supra, if a search warrant or
subpoena is not obtained for the actual sample, the results of
tests performed on already drawn hospital blood from a D.W.I.
defendant can only be used if the People rely on the implied
consent provisions of the Vehicle and Traffic Law,55 or the
48 See id. (distinguishing between primary and secondary evidence and outlining that
primary evidence would be excluded even if it would most likely have been discovered in
course of normal police procedures, but, secondary evidence, on the other hand, could
possibly be admitted).
49 69 N.Y.2d 313 (1987).
50 Id. at 318.
51 Id. at 318; see also Turriago,90 N.Y.2d at 86.
52 See Stith, 69 N.Y.2d at 318 (noting it is tainted evidence itself and not product of
evidence that is saved from exclusion).
53 Id. at 318 (stating "It is not the tainted evidence that is admitted, but only what
was found as a result of information or leads gleaned from the evidence.").
54 People v. James, 256 A.D.2d 1149, 1149 (4th Dept. 1998) (noting any interpretation
by New York court to admit primary evidence is "misplaced"); see also People v. Vega, 256
A.D.2d 730, 731 (3d Dept. 1998) (noting the "inevitable discovery" doctrine applies only to
secondary evidence and not to the items uncovered in an illegal search).
55 See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194 (2)(a) (McKinney 2005) (containing deemed
consent provisions). The statute states:
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defendant has provided actual consent to having their blood
drawn. 56 In New York, in the absence of the applicability of the
deemed consent statute, a defendant's consent to the drawing of
blood is valid so long as it is txpress and voluntary. 57 A court
may entertain a defense motion pursuant to New York Criminal
Procedure Law § 710.20 (5),58 and suppress the results should it

Chemical tests. (a) When authorized. Any person who operates a motor vehicle in this
state shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test of one or more of the
following: breath, blood, urine, or saliva, for the purpose of determining the alcoholic
and/or drug content of the blood provided that such test is administered by or at the
direction of a police officer with respect to a chemical test of breath, urine or saliva or,
with respect to a chemical test of blood, at the direction of a police officer:
(1) having reasonable grounds to believe such person to have been operating in
violation of any subdivision of section eleven hundred ninety-two of this article and
within two hours after such person has been placed under arrest for any such
violation; or having reasonable grounds to believe such person to have been operating
in violation of section eleven hundred ninety-two-a of this article and within two
hours after the stop of such person for any such violation,
(2) within two hours after a breath test, as provided in paragraph (b) of subdivision
one of this section, indicates that alcohol has been consumed by such person and in
accordance with the rules and regulations established by the police force of which the
officer is a member ....
(emphasis added); see also People v. Goodell, 79 N.Y.2d 869, 870 (1992) (noting where
conditions of § 1192 are satisfied, statute provides authority for administration of blood
alcohol test even in absence of court order or suspect's actual consent); People v. Hart, 266
A.D.2d 698, 699 (3d Dept. 1999) (stating under implied consent provision "[a] motorist is
deemed to have consented to the administration of a blood alcohol test provided that there
were reasonable grounds to believe that such individual was driving while
intoxicated .. "); People v. Capraella, 165 Misc. 2d 639, 643 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1995)
(stating, "in exchange for the privilege of being licensed to drive in this State, every
motorist in this State is deemed to have given advance consent to submit to such a
'search' where certain conditions precedent are present").
56 See Capraella,165 Misc. 2d at 644 stating:
[A] simple request to submit to a breathalyzer examination without more, can result
in a voluntary consent as long as there is no express or implied coercion by law
enforcement officials, no material misrepresentation of fact, to induce the consent and
no facts to suggest that any law enforcement officials in securing an individual's
consent acted in a manner so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a due process
violation as to negate any consent.
see also People v. Atkins, 85 N.Y.2d 1007, 1008 (1995) (noting there must be express and
voluntary consent if implied consent statute is not applicable).
57 See Atkins, 85 N.Y.2d 1007, 1008; People v. Ellis, 190 Misc.2d 98, 105 (Cattaraugus
Co. Crim. Ct. 2001) (stating in case where defendant contested consent provided, that "the
prosecution must prove by clear and convincing evidence that a consent was
unequivocally, voluntary and free given by a suspect"). see also United States v. Drayton,
536 U.S. 194, 206-07 (2002) (confirming consent must be voluntary based on totality of
circumstances); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) holding,
oilly that when the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to
justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not
the result of duress or coercion, express or implied. Voluntariness is a question of fact
to be determined from all the circumstances.
58 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 710.20 (5) (McKinney 2005).
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find that deemed consent was not applicable or valid consent was
never provided.59
Without valid consent, the results of blood samples drawn at
the request of the police will not be admissible against the
defendant at trial due to the physician-patient privilege. 60 This
evidentiary privilege, codified in New York Civil Practice Law
and Rules § 4504,61 affords privilege to "confidential
communications," and states,
Unless the patient waives the privilege, a person authorized
to practice medicine, registered professional nursing,
licensed practical nursing, dentistry, podiatry or chiropractic
shall not be allowed to disclose any information which he
acquired in attending a patient in a professional capacity,
and which was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity. The relationship of a physician and patient shall
exist between a medical corporation, as defined in article
forty-four of the public health law, a professional service
corporation organized under article fifteen of the business
corporation law to practice medicine, a university faculty
practice corporation organized under section fourteen
hundred twelve of the not-for-profit corporation law to
practice medicine or dentistry, and the patients to whom
they respectively render professional medical services. 6 2

59 See People v. Ayala, 89 N.Y.2d 874 (1996) (finding that Criminal Procedure Law §
710.20 (5) allows motions for suppression for chemical tests, regardless of whether they
are court ordered or otherwise).
60 However, one New York case should be pointed out. In People v. Ameigh, 95 A.D.2d
367 (3d Dept. 1983), the Third Department allowed the results of the defendant's blood
alcohol test to be used against the defendant at trial. In this case, hospital personnel
drew blood samples for diagnostic testing and treatment. When asked to submit to a blood
test to determine blood alcohol content, the defendant refused. The People obtained
information regarding the defendant's blood alcohol content through pre-trial discovery,
and used this information against the defendant at trial. Despite the issue in this case
being the use of the information by the prosecution, there was no mention of the
physician-patient privilege. Perhaps the argument was never made because the defendant
did not raise it, and voluntarily handed over the results of the blood test without claiming
privilege. It is unclear why issues concerning the physician-patient were not discussed in
the opinion, but the Court did note that "[any other possible evidentiary objections to the
admissibility of the test results may be properly raised at the trial." Id. at 369-70.
Nevertheless, this case seems like a prime situation in which the privilege should have
been asserted to preclude admission of evidence regarding the defendant's blood alcohol
level at trial.
61 N.Y.CPLR § 4504 (McKinney 2005) (describing confidentiality within physician
patient privilege).
62 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW & R. § 4504 (McKinney 2005) (noting valid consent to law
enforcement request is construed as waiver).
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The Court of Appeals has outlined the purpose behind this
privilege. The Court has noted that this privilege "serves three
core policy objectives 63 ... [1) it] seeks to maximize unfettered
patient communication with medical professionals. . .;64 [2) it]
encourages medical professionals to be candid in recording
confidential information in patient medical records... ;65 [and 3)
it] protects patients' reasonable privacy expectations against
disclosure of sensitive personal information. .. "66 Over time, New
York courts have afforded this provision "broad and liberal
construction to carry out" these policies. 67 Likewise, statutes that
may be interpreted to limit the scope of this New York physician68
patient privilege have been narrowly interpreted.
Although it appears that this privilege is given great weight,
only those matters falling within the protections of the privilege
are covered. This privilege, as noted above, protects 'confidential
communications,' which is, in turn, information between
physician and patient. Other types of evidence obtained during
the normal course of treatment are not afforded the same
protections as information. One type of evidence obtained during
the course of treatment not categorized as information is tangible
property. Although great measures are taken to protect
communications between physician and patient, tangible
property obtained is not protected in the same manner. 69
Because of the differences between protected information and
unprotected tangible property, 70 when confronted with a driving
63 In re New York County v. Morganthau, 98 N.Y.2d 525, 529 (2002).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id; see also People v. Bloom, 193 N.Y. 1, 7 (1908) (providing the origin of the
physician-patient privilege).
67 In re Grand Jury Investigation of Onondaga County, 59 N.Y.2d 130, 134 (1983)
(citing In re City Council of N.Y. v. Goldwater, 284 N.Y. 296, 300 (1940)); see People v.
Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 143 (1956) (noting statute should be 'liberally construed").
68 See People v. Sinski, 88 N.Y.2d 487, 491 (1996) (recognizing courts have narrowly
interpreted limitations on physician-patient privilege). But see In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated December 14, 1984 v. Kuriansky, 69 N.Y.2d 232, 240
(1987) (holding physician-patient privilege yields to investigation concerning Medicaid
fraud).
69 See People v. Downs, 5 A.D.2d 935, 936 (3d Dept. 1958) (establishing blood
specimen as evidence rather than "information"); see also People v. Kemp, 59 A.D.2d 414,
419 (1st Dept. 1977) (concluding that testimonial marital privilege, which is similar to
physician-patient privilege, cannot be used to prevent admission of physical evidence
obtained via communications within realm of marital privilege).
70 The distinction between the protections afforded to information as compared to
tangible property under the physician-patient privilege appears to be strikingly similar to
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while intoxicated related offense, a clear distinction must
initially be made. Should the case be dependent upon admission
of the results of blood tests performed on the defendant while in
the hospital to determine the level of intoxication, potentially
protected and privileged results of the blood test, as compared to
the actual blood sample itself should be distinguished. Unlike
the actual sample, without obtaining a valid waiver 71 of the
physician-patient privilege by the defendant prior to the drawing
of blood, the results of the blood test will be inadmissible as
falling within the protections of the physician-patient privilege. 7 2
the distinction between protected testimonial evidence under the self-incrimination clause
and items deemed non-testimonial, which do not convey the thoughts of one's mind. Nontestimonial evidence is not subject to any Fifth Amendment protection because the
witness was never compelled to be a witness against himself within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment. See e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589 (1990).
The Supreme Court has articulated that in order for a communication to be testimonial
and therefore protected by the privilege against self-incrimination, it must "relate to a
factual assertion or disclose information." Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988).
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has declared that "compulsion which makes a
suspect or accused the source of 'real or physical evidence' does not violate the privilege
against self-incrimination. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966). The Court
has also stated that the "prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness
against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be
material." Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910). This distinction has been
used to admit voice exemplars that were not used for "testimonial or communicative
content." United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1973). It has also been recognized to
compel criminal defendants to "put on a shirt, to provide a blood sample, or a handwriting
exemplar, or to make a recording of his voice." United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35
(2000). Finally, the Court has held that a criminal defendant's refusal to take a sobriety
test is admissible. See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 (1983).
The standards articulated by the Supreme Court have been applied by New York
courts. The New York Court of Appeals has stated that a testimonial communication
"relate[s] a factual assertion or disclose[s] information." People v. Berg, 92 N.Y.2d 701,
704 (1999). It has also described testimonial communications as "reveal[ing] a person's
subjective knowledge or thought processes." People v. Hager, 69 N.Y.2d 141, 142(1987).
Applying these definitions, the Court of Appeals has concluded that results from
performance tests are admissible. See also People v. Jacquin, 71 N.Y.2d 825, 826 (1988).
The Court of Appeals has also held that evidence that a defendant refused to take a
sobriety test is admissible as long as it was not "extracted from the defendant by
compulsion." People v. Thomas, 46 N.Y.2d 100, 107 (1978). Finally, the New York City
Criminal Court has found that a defendant's verbal consent to a sobriety test is
admissible. People v. Rosario, 136 Misc.2d 445, 449 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1987).
71 See People v. Petro, 122 A.D.2d 309, 310 (3d Dept. 1986) (finding blood test results
as suppressed under physician-patient privilege if defendant did not waive privilege and
no exception applied).
72 See Dillenbeck v. Hess, 73 N.Y.2d 278, 289 (1989) (declaring defendant had not
waived physician-patient privilege and therefore, information regarding his blood alcohol
content from blood test taken at hospital following car accident "indisputably falls within
the scope of the physician-patient privilege"); see also Petro, 122 A.D.2d at 310 (asserting
blood test results as indicating defendant's blood alcohol level obtained without valid
waiver from defendant were not admissible pursuant to physician-patient privilege). But
see People v. Hagin, 238 A.D.2d 714, 715 (3d Dept. 1997) (analyzing case where defendant
consented to having blood drawn and explaining that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194
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IV. THE USE OF SEARCH WARRANTS IN NEW YORK
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS TO WORK AROUND THE
PHYSICIAN PATIENT PRIVILEGE.
An unwary prosecutor should note this critical distinction
between information and tangible evidence. Although, when
blood test results are an issue in drinking and driving related
offenses, the blood tests as well as the results garnered from
those tests may seem inextricably interwoven, there may be a
safe way for prosecutors to lawfully obtain information from
these samples that falls within the privilege. 73 This is through
use of what is commonly referred to as a 'Bolson warrant' for
74
already-drawn blood samples.

(4)(a)(1)(i) does not allow defendant to exclude blood test results regarding blood alcohol
content based on nurse-patient privilege because test was not essential to defendant's
treatment) (citation omitted).
73 Bolson warrants may be a way around the procedures that must be followed in
order to obtain blood test results because it is hospital-drawn blood, and not policeobtained blood, that is being sought. People v. Bolson, 183 Misc.2d 155, 159-60 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Queens Cty 1999).
In addition, there may be a distinction between the admissibility of blood and other
chemical test results obtained via use of Bolson warrants for charges of Vehicle and
Traffic Law § 1192.2, as compared to § 1192.3. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192.2
(McKinney 2005). (stating "[n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle while such person
has . 10 of one per centum or more by weight of alcohol in the person's blood as shown by
chemical analysis of such person's blood, breath, urine or saliva, made pursuant to the
provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-four of this article."). In contrast, section
1192.3, which is considered the 'common law' D.W.I. charge, makes no such reference to
the procedures mandated by Section 1194. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192.3 (McKinney
2005).
74 Bolson, 183 Misc. 2d at 159-60 (articulating when blood samples do not fall within
physician-patient privilege).
It is important to note that the warrant must be valid pursuant to New York Criminal
Procedure Law. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 690.35 (McKinney 2005). Also, the Supreme
Court has held that a search warrant requires a showing of probable cause. Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 112 (1964). Probable cause can be established through hearsay
information as long as there is evidence of the informant's knowledge and reliability. Id.
at 114-115. This standard has been consistently followed and elaborated on by the Court.
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 412-17 (1969).
New York also requires that a warrant meet the Aguilar-Spinelli standard and that
there is "a reasonable showing that the informant was reliable and had a basis of
knowledge for the statement." People v Hetrick, 80 N.Y.2d 344, 348 (1992). If one of the
Aguilar-Spinelli requirements is not met, the search warrant cannot be validly executed.
see also, People v. Serrano, 93 N.Y.2d 73, 78 (1999). New York courts have also asserted
that information is accepted as reliable if it is given to the police by an identified person
or based on the first-hand observations of a police officer.
It should also be noted that procuring tangible blood samples by use of subpoena
rather than by search warrant has been accomplished, yet there is no printed litigated
precedent on point. Although there are both substantive and procedural distinguishing
characteristics between search warrants and subpoenas, the question regarding tangible
evidence versus information for doctor-patient privileges remains the same. Hubbell, 530
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People v. Bolson 7 5 involved a motor vehicle accident and a
defendant suspected of driving a motor vehicle while
intoxicated. 76 The defendant was taken to the hospital, where
three blood samples were drawn for treatment, and an additional
sample was drawn for "for the specific purpose of testing for
alcohol." 7 7 Two days after this blood was drawn, a search
warrant was obtained "to procure and test the samples of the
defendant's blood held by" the hospital.7 8 Subsequent to the
execution of the warrant, all samples. were tested by the New
79
York Medical Examiner's Office.
The defendant moved to controvert the search warrant on
several grounds, including that the information obtained from
the warrant was "privileged and confidential." 80 Addressing
whether or not the subject matter of the warrant was protected
privilege, the Bolson Court
by the physician-patient
acknowledged that the results of the test "contain[ed] the kind of
information which 'was the product of professional skill and
knowledge and ... [thus] a protected communication"' pursuant
to C.P.L.R. § 4504.81 However, the Bolson Court went a step
further by aptly pointing out that privileged results were not the
items to be sought; but rather, the actual blood samples were the
items to be sought.8 2 Because these actual samples were
"physical evidence," 83 the physician-patient privilege was not
applicable and the test results obtained by the Medical
Examiner's Office of the lawfully obtained blood samples were
admissible against the defendant at trial.8 4 Further, although
U.S. at 35-37. Thus, a prosecutor may wish to utilize a subpoena to obtain blood rather
than a warrant.
75 183 Misc. 2d 155 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. 1999).
76 See id at 157.
77 Id. at 157.
78 Id. at 157.
79 Id. at 157(describing testing process of blood samples).
80 People v. Bolson, 183 Misc. 2d 155, 157 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. 1999)
81 Id. at 159 (citing Dillenbeck, 73 N.Y.2d 278, 284 n.4 (1989)).
82 Bolson, 183 Misc. 2d at 159 (noting privileged blood alcohol test results were not to
be obtained by warrant).
83 Id. at 156.
84 It should be noted that the Bolson court distinguished between the three vials
drawn for treatment and the additional vial drawn to determine blood alcohol content. Id.
at 160. Although the Court noted that the vial drawn for the purpose of determining blood
alcohol content was not necessary for the defendant's treatment, the Bolson decision does
not reflect a substantive difference between those vials drawn for treatment and the vial
drawn for a blood alcohol content determination. Instead, the Bolson decision to deny
suppression of the results of the blood test focuses on the items sought by the warrant,
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the Bolson Court noted that "[riesults generated by [a]
defendant's treating physician at the hospital for purposes of
treatment and diagnosis remain under the protective aegis of the
physician-patient privilege,"85 the Bolson Court pointed out that
since "a blood sample is not unlike other tangible property... the

seizure of the blood samples simply does not impinge upon or
seek to pierce the physician-patient privilege."8 6
V. APPLICATION OF THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY
THEORY
A.

Why Use It

Maybe going into detail about the physician-patient privilege
assumes too much. Perhaps it is assuming that the consent of
the defendant was not validly obtained - it was not impliedly or
expressly and voluntarily provided8 7 - thus bringing the results
of the test back into the realm of privileged physician-patient
communications. The prosecutor's goal is to prevent this from
physical and real evidence, which is not protected under C.P.L.R. § 4504. It would appear
that from this decision, although the purposes in drawing the multiple vials may have
been different, in the end, this marks, for criminal prosecution purposes, a distinction
without a difference. Id. at 160.
85 Id. at 160 (emphasis added).
86 People v. Bolson, 183 Misc. 2d 155, 159 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. 1999); Cf.
People v. Thomas, No. 01-0429-001, 2001 WL 1722892, *1 (Sup. Ct. Erie Cty. Oct. 30,
2001). Thomas involved a motor vehicle accident with motorist suspected of driving while
intoxicated. Two of the defendant's passengers died at the scene as a result. After the
defendant was admitted to a hospital, ten vials of blood were drawn "for diagnostic and
treatment purposes." Approximately an hour and a half later, the defendant consented to
having his blood drawn to determine blood alcohol content. Five days after the accident, a
search warrant was obtained for one of the vials drawn for diagnostic and treatment
purposes. The warrant did not authorize seizure of any records. Because of the search
warrant, and the separate testing of the actual blood sample, the prosecution had two
separate pieces of evidence indicating the defendant's blood alcohol level.
The Thomas court did not permit the test results of the blood vial obtain via the search
warrant to be admitted against the defendant. The Thomas court attempted to
distinguish the facts presented to those in Bolson. However, no clear distinction was
made. Although the Thomas decision alluded to the principles of the physician-patient
privilege, introduction of the secondary test results was denied for the sole reason of not
admitting cumulative evidence. The Thomas court stated, "[s]ince the prosecution already
has evidence of the defendant's blood alcohol content obtained within two hours of his
arrest, there is no need to introduce test results of blood drawn for diagnostic and
treatment purposes." In denying admission on this ground, the Thomas court did not
detract from the Bolson distinction between tangible property and privileged information.
87 See People v. Atkins, 85 N.Y.2d 1007, 1008-09 (1995) (implying that consent of
defendant is validly obtained when either impliedly or expressly and voluntarily
provided).
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occurring. So, as noted, the prosecutor should never be so
confident as to place all of his eggs into one basket and depend
solely on surviving a suppression motion on a premonition that
consent was valid. This should be an important concern to the
prosecutor of the driving while intoxicated offense when the case
involves substantial property damage, multiple victims, is highprofile, or when injuries occur but do not rise to the level of what
criteria is necessary for a court-ordered compulsory blood test.
As this type of case is not one where the prosecutor should
gamble, the principles of inevitable discovery may be useful to
protect the case. In sum, the question to be asked should be, if
the case is one in which a Bolson warrant is obtained for actual
tangible blood samples, could the warrant be used to
retroactively justify the validity of the initial sample if the
secondary sample does not return accurate results, is not tested,
or is itself not legally admissible.
B. Effects on a Subsequent Sample
Utilization of the inevitable discovery theory in relation to
blood samples of intoxicated defendants should only arise when
the secondary sample-the very sample sought to be obtained
through the Bolson warrant-has been affected in some way, and
a proper blood alcohol reading cannot be obtained by its analysis.
A secondary sample can be affected in a myriad of ways.
Without delving into every possible reason for how a sample of
blood can become unreliable, for purposes of this article, it would
be most practical to discuss the most probable way that a sample
can be affected. This would occur most likely through failure to
properly preserve the specimen, or if the specimen is so
insufficient that valid testing cannot be performed on it.ss
When a 'blood-job' is performed by a trained officer on an
individual suspected of driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated,
the blood specimen is preserved to prevent the blood from
clotting, or changing its form or decaying, in any type of manner
that would affect or distort the defendant's correct blood alcohol
88 See Department of Pathology Clinical Services, Collecting Blood Specimens, UTMB
Laboratory Survival Guide, May 31, http://www.utmb.edullsglLabSurvivaGuideCollec
tingBloodSpecimens.html (last visited May 28, 2005) (discussing potential ways blood
specimens can be affected).
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content.8 9 Officers trained to administer 'blood jobs' are familiar
with the items found in a standard blood kit. These items,
namely 'vacutainer' 90 tubes containing preservatives, sterile
needles, non-alcoholic swabs, evidence seals, instruction sheets,
and other various forms, are strategically placed inside of a blood
kit to assist the officer when the 'blood job' is performed. 9 1 An
additional substance contained within the kit vials, commonly
known as an 'anticoagulant,' is used to prevent the blood from
clotting. 92 Prevention of clotting helps to maintain the correct
blood alcohol content at the time the sample is drawn. 9 3 Blood is
placed in a vacutainer, a sterile tube designed to prevent
interference with stored samples, and is mixed with
preservatives, 9 4 to maintain this blood alcohol level. Such a vial
and preservatives are used because alcohol dissipates more
95
rapidly than other substances which can be found in the blood.
New York law mandates the use of such vials, preservatives and

89 See id. (explaining preservation procedure).
90 See University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, Specimen Container Types,
Clinical Laboratory, at http://www.uams.edu/clinlab/specimencont.html (last visited Feb.
15, 2004) (describing different types of vacutainer tubes); see also Becton Dickinson,
at
Accessories,
Safety-Lok
and
Tubes
Collection
Blood
Vacutainer
http://www.vgdllc.com/bbs/messagesfVACUTAINER.html (last visited
May 28, 2005) (providing technical information regarding design and purpose of
vacutainer tubes).
91 See NIK Safety Collection Kits, at http://www.armorholdings.com/productsdiv/nik.
asp (last visited March 28, 2005) (noting different items contained in kits from NIK Public
Safety, dominant maker of law enforcement blood kits).
92 See Ethanol: Sample Collection and Preparation for Analysis at http://www.
toxicology.lsumc.edulethanol.htm (last visited May 11, 2004).
93 See id.
94 The correct term to define the process in which the blood, anticoagulant and
preservatives are mixed is known as 'inverting' the blood vial. See http://www.labcorp.
com/datasets/labcorp/htmlfrontm-group/frontm/section/speccol.htm (last visited March
28, 2005) (stating tubes containing the preservatives must be turned over in order to
properly mix the preservatives).
95 See Alcohol and the Human Body, at http://www.intox.com/physiology.asp (last
visited March 28, 2005) stating,
Healthy people metabolize alcohol at a fairly consistent rate. As a rule of thumb, a
person will eliminate one average drink or .5 oz (15 ml) of alcohol per hour. Several
factors influence this rate. The rate of elimination tends to be higher when the blood
alcohol concentration in the body is very high or very low. Also chronic alcoholics may
(depending on liver health) metabolize alcohol at a significantly higher rate than
average. Finally, the body's ability to metabolize alcohol quickly tend to diminish
with age.
see also Alcohol Absorption, Distribution and Elimination, at http://www.forcon.ca/
learning/alcohol.html (last visited March 28, 2005) (stating, "[t]he median rate of decrease
in BAC is considered to be 15 milligrams per cent (mg%) per hour.").
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anticoagulant to be used in the withdrawal process. 9 6 Title ten,
section 59.2 of the New York Compilation of Codes Rules and
Regulations 97 specifically states that "[b]lood must be drawn with
a: (i) sterile dry needle into a vacuum container containing a solid
anticoagulant; or (ii) sterile dry needle and syringe and deposited
into a clean container containing a solid anticoagulant, which
container shall then be capped or stoppered, and identified."98
In order to preserve the blood alcohol content in the blood
specimen, a police officer follows certain guidelines that may be
different than the hospital's procedures for handling the same
type of specimen. 99 In sum, a police officer must have a
physician, a registered nurse, a registered physician's assistant,
a medical laboratory technician or technologist, or an authorized
individual possessing necessary competence and acting under the
supervision of a laboratory director and physician draw the blood
from the defendant.oo The sample is to be collected within two
hours of the time of arrest,101 and the defendant's skin, in the
area where the sample is to be drawn, is to be rubbed with an
aqueous non-alcoholic solution containing a nonvolatile
antiseptic.10 2 This substance is applied to the area by use of a
swab. The sample is to be drawn using the aforementioned type
of needle and containers. 10 3 Legally, failure to adhere to these
procedures in drawing blood may lead to suppression of the blood
results.10 4 Scientifically, and without delving in depth about
96 Methods and Procedures for Determining Blood and Urine Alcohol, 10 NYCRR §
59.2(c)(4)(ii) (2005) (noting requirements for proper storing of blood samples).
97 See N.Y. COMP. CODES, R. & R., tit. 10, § 59.2 (2005) (outlining methods and
procedures for taking blood).
98 See N.Y. COMP. CODES, R. & R., tit. 10, § 59.2 (c)(4) (2005) (noting proper procedure
for taking blood).
99 See generally People v. Thomas, No. 01-0429-001, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 946 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Oct. 30, 2001) (comparing differences between general hospital procedures, and
those police must follow pursuant to New York law).
100 See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. L. § 1194 (4)(a)(1) (2004) (designating certain persons as
qualified to withdraw blood).
101 See id. at § 1194 (2)(a)(1) (setting forth two-hour time period for administering
tests).
102 See N.Y. COMP. CODES, R. & R., tit. 10, § 59.2 (c)(3) (2005) (setting forth rule that
alcoholic solutions are not used in order to prevent any type of interference with blood
alcohol content reading).
103 See NIK Safety Collection Kits at http://www.armorholdings.comlproductsdiv/nik.
asp (last visited March 28, 2004) (providing information about law enforcement blood
kits).
104 See People v. Ebner, 195 A.D.2d 1006, 1007 (4th Dept. 1993) (suppressing results
of blood test in D.W.I. case when test was authorized but not observed by registered
nurse, and no evidence existed that test was authorized by physician).
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every possible way in which a sample can be negatively affected,
it is safe to say that the less that the sample is properly
preserved,10 5 the lower the chance of obtaining a correct blood
alcohol content reading.106 This latter reason, in turn, may lead
to the creation of unnecessary exculpatory evidence that must be
readily made available to defense.107
Use of the inevitable discovery theory in blood sample cases
has been thought of,108 and somewhat discussed, 109 but not
In the absence of a situation involving coercive
applied.
and hence unconstitutional
tactics, 1 10 or unreasonable
1 1 1 there exists no reason why a good-faith
circumstances,
argument should not be afforded consideration, should proper
In this situation, the
use of a Bolson warrant be made.
105 See Walter S. Piper, Preservation of Blood Samples, at http://www.briloon.org/
bloodpreservation.html (last visited November 2, 2002) (outlining general practice of
adding preservatives to blood samples to ensure that subsequent testing is as effective as
possible).
106 But see People v. Boyst, 177 A.D.2d 962 (4th Dept. 1991) (upholding procedure in
which blood serum, rather than anticoagulant, was used in preservation of blood sample,
which is authorized to be tested for blood alcohol content under New York law). This case
appears to stand for the proposition that so long as an authorized substance is tested, the
lack of use of preservatives in the blood sample would go towards the credibility of the
evidence, and not automatically preclude its admissibility.
107 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding "the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or
bad faith of the prosecution.").
108 See People v. Siripongs, 754 P.2d 1306, 1317 (Cal. 1988) (recognizing even though
defendant's blood was not lawfully drawn, it was harmless error because "[a] blood sample
would inevitably have been [legally] drawn and would have disclosed the identical
information used against [the defendant] at trial").
109 See Iowa v. Bartlett, No. 1-800 / 01-0158, 2002 Iowa App. LEXIS 878, at *2 (Iowa
Ct. App. August 14, 2002) (mentioning prosecution's argument to admit blood sample
under inevitable discovery doctrine, even though court never itself addressed this issue);
see also State v. Christianson, 627 N.W.2d 910, 912-13 (Iowa 2001) (refusing to admit
results of blood test under inevitable discovery theory in case where no basis to believe
that defendant was intoxicated existed subsequent to motor vehicle accident, and taking
into account Iowa's implied consent laws); State v. Ravotto, 169 N.J. 227, 244 (2001)
(citing Nix, finding 'independent source' theory as not applicable to situation in which
blood samples were obtained by unreasonable force because, despite prosecution's
arguments to contrary, it is not clear whether prosecution still would have received blood
tests through lawful mean).
110 See Ravotto, 169 N.J. at 231 (noting despite "defendant's right to be free of
unreasonable searches under the federal and State Constitutions," defendant's legs and
left arm were strapped to table, while several persons, including two police officers, held
him down as nurse drew eight vials of blood).
111 See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 767 (1985) (finding state-ordered surgery to
remove bullet in armed robbery suspect's body was unreasonable search, and as such, was
unconstitutional); see also People v. Ellis, 190 Misc.2d 98, 106 (Cattaraugus Co. Crim. Ct.
2001) (suppressing blood test results in D.W.I. case, finding that consent was obtained
after police officer provided defendant with "inaccurately threatening legal repercussions"
when speaking of consequences of failing to consent to taking of blood sample).
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prosecutor would have both the initial blood sample, albeit
potentially inadmissible, as well as the second blood sample. In
theory, however, both items should be similar pieces of evidence.
Nevertheless, the prosecutor should be prepared to counter a
defense contention that the secondary sample is not admissible
through the use of inevitable discovery principles because of the
New York distinction between inadmissible primary evidence
and admissible secondary evidence.11 2 Essentially, it would
appear that the argument to be advanced is, in sum and
substance, that if the initial piece of evidence, the blood sample
drawn at the request of the police, is not admissible against the
defendant due to invalid consent, then the search warrant for the
secondary sample should not be allowed to retroactively justify
admission of the first blood sample under the inevitable discovery
theory because the two blood samples are the same. The defense
argument would be that even if inevitable discovery principles
were applicable to the situation, New York's prohibition against
admitting primary evidence would preclude admission of the
blood sample because in this situation, both the primary and the
secondary evidence are the same. Thus far, New York case law
discussing inevitable discovery applicability has not addressed a
situation in which the primary and secondary evidence were the
same item obtained through police misconduct. 113
Of course, the defense can also proffer two separate
contentions: that use of the second blood sample would
circumvent the principles behind the physician-patient privilege;
and that since the secondary blood sample was affected in a way
that ultimately created exculpatory evidence, the prosecution
cannot demonstrate a "very high degree of probability"11 4 that
112 See People v. Turriago, 90 N.Y.2d 77, 86 (1997) (highlighting that court has
established "primary evidence.., would still be subject to exclusion even if it would most
likely have been discovered in the course of routine police procedures").
113 See generally John Brunetti, Criminal Procedure, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 51920 (1998) (highlighting that New York Court of Appeals has recognized that inevitable
discovery exception will not save primary evidence from suppression, but will apply to
secondary evidence).
114 See People v. More, 97 N.Y.2d 209, 213 (2002) (highlighting "even where there is a
clear indication that incriminating evidence will be retrieved if the bodily intrusion is
permitted, search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and absent
an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the human body are
concerned"); see also People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 506 (1973) (noting in order to
apply inevitable discovery doctrine, prosecution must show that, absent illicit conduct,
police investigation still would have led to evidence). See generally Nix v. Williams, 467
U.S. 431, 443 (1984) (noting in order to invoke inevitable discovery doctrine, prosecution
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the correct blood alcohol results would have been obtained
anyway.
Although the latter two concepts may have some merit, this
article focuses on the first contention, notably the distinction
between primary and secondary evidence. 1 15 Obviously, the first
blood sample drawn from the defendant is identical to other
samples, drawn for diagnostic purposes. In addition, both items
are potential pieces of incriminating evidence that were (in the
usual situation) sought and withdrawn contemporaneously with
one another. There should exist little, if any, distinction between
the initially obtained sample and the sample sought via the
warrant. Most likely, the only differences are that each specimen
was placed into different vials, contain different levels of
preservatives and anticoagulants, and may have involved
different types of swabs used to cleanse the skin in the area
1 16
where the blood was drawn.
Nevertheless, the prosecutor should advance inevitable
discovery principles. Despite there being little factual distinction
between the primary and secondary evidence in this situation,
the prosecutor should argue that there is a legal distinction
between the two samples that would allow applicability of the
inevitable discovery theory. The prosecutor should argue that
those cases applying inevitable discovery principles usually
involve situations in which invalid consent or unlawfully
obtained statements by a defendant lead to the discovery of
incriminating physical evidence. 1 17 In the situation that is the

must establish by preponderance of evidence that information ultimately or inevitably
would have been discovered by lawful means).
115 It should be noted that although an argument negating the likelihood of a high
probability that the blood sample with the correct blood alcohol level would have been
obtained anyway due to reasons for why the sample was negatively affected intimately
relates to the inevitable discovery theory, it is not being addressed in this article because
it hinges on a question of fact, to be answered on a case by case basis. In this situation,
the general principles of inevitable discovery would have to apply. In addition, the
contention that use of the defendant's blood sample would be an unfair governmental
attempt to protect a highly recognized privilege should be deafened by the clear
distinction between protected information between physician and patient and physical
tangible property, which the blood sample is.
116 See People v. Thomas, No. 01-0429-001, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 946, at *3 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Oct. 30, 2001) (describing possible differences in procedures used).
117 See, e.g., Turriago, 90 N.Y.2d at 82-83 (providing situation in which, if probable
cause at time of arrest was lacking, inevitable discovery principles could be invoked to
allow admissibility of evidence obtained from statements made by defendant); see also
Nix, 467 U.S. at 446-47 (illustrating classic situation in which illegally obtained
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subject of this article, the evidence sought to be admitted is an
item that would have been obtained anyway based on the
circumstances, regardless of whether or not the police ever
became involved. The prosecutor should argue that blood would
have been drawn anyway by hospital personnel, individuals not
involved with law enforcement, and that the blood would have
been drawn pursuant to hospital procedures for diagnostic
testing. As the sample would have been obtained without any
influence by anyone acting for or as an agent of law-enforcement,
and would have been obtained pursuant to established hospital
procedures, it would have been in existence even if no police
presence or request for the sample were made. Further, and in
the alternative, for this reason, the prosecutor should point out
that the secondary specimen that is sought through the warrant
is not within the literal New York definition of 'secondary
evidence,'118 as it was not obtained as a result of or product of the
primary evidence, the initial sample. Thus, there is no causal
connection between the evidence that is sought and the taint due
to unlawful police activity.1 19 This lack of a connection negates
any improper exploitation of misconduct. Notwithstanding, the
only notable distinction between the two vials would be how. they
would be separately handled pursuant to police department and
hospital procedures. As such, the end result would be that the
actual blood sample would have anyway, inevitably, been
And despite there lacking a possible
lawfully obtained.
distinction without an evidentiary or privileged difference
between the initial and secondary sample, the bottom line would
be that as the evidence was lawfully obtained in the first place,
the inevitable discovery distinction between use of primary and
secondary evidence should not bar admission of what the
prosecution has lawfully and diligently sought from the outsetthe physical blood specimen. This use of the second sample
would not "defeat a primary purpose [of the inevitable discovery
doctrine,] deterrence of police misconduct."12 0 In addition,
statements lead to discovery of physical evidence admitted against defendant at trial
pursuant to the inevitable discovery theory).
118 See, e.g., Turriago,90 N.Y.2d at 86 (defining secondary source).
119 See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 320 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(discussing new rule adopted by Court); see also Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 697
(1982) (stating controlling substantive law).
120 People v. Stith, 69 N.Y.2d 313, 319 (1987).
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preclusion of a secondary sample, legally obtained via warrant,
would place the government in a weaker position than it
originally was in, a position also contrary to another main
rationale used to justify the inevitable discovery principle.121 In
addition, little merit should be placed in any defense claim that
application of inevitable discovery principles to this situation
would discourage the police in properly having or obtaining valid
consent, as there still would exist little incentive to disregard
established principles and procedures when performing 'blood
jobs' in cases involving personal injuries or substantial property
damages.
Further, a defendant would not have any greater possessory
interest in the blood obtained via warrant than he would have in
the blood obtained at the request of the police.122 As such, there
is no greater intrusion of an individual's personal privacy by law
The defendant's
enforcement than initially was present.
expectation of privacy 12 3 in the secondary blood sample is de
minimus, as the defendant purported to waive any privacy right
or privilege in the specimen from the outset of treatment. Thus,
there appears to be no constitutional distinction between the
privacy rights afforded to the primary evidence as compared to
the secondary evidence, providing increased justification for
application of the inevitable discovery theory to search warrants
for diagnostic blood samples.
VI. CONCLUSION
This piece has discussed two principles of New York law that,
on its face, do not seem to bear any relation to one another.
Nevertheless, prosecutors of drinking and driving related
offenses involving substantial property damage or victims should
be somewhat familiar with the applicability of the physician121 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (stating rationale of inevitable
discovery principle).
122 See State v. Barkley, 551 S.E.2d 131, 135 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (stating "defendant
does not challenge the validity of the taking of the blood sample; rather defendant
concedes it was done with his consent. Once the blood was lawfully drawn from
defendant's body, he no longer had a possessory interest in that blood.").
123 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(formulating two part test that would become followed cornerstone of Fourth Amendment
analysis-that individual is afforded constitutional protection when reasonable
expectation of privacy that society is willing to accept as reasonable is subject of search).
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patient privilege as well as the inevitable discovery theory. So
long as the protections afforded by the physician-patient
privilege are not pierced, proper use of an inevitable discovery
theory should be advanced to admit an initial blood sample found
by a suppression court to be improperly obtained. Use of this
theory may help serve a substantial purpose, as well as an
affirmative tool, in the fight against those who consume enough
alcoholic beverages to affect one's ability to drive, and then get
into the driver's seat.

